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AFTER THE REVOLUTION: EGYPT’S CHANGING FORMS OF 
CORRUPTION 
 
M. PATRICK YINGLING AND MOHAMED A. ‘ARAFA 
 
ABSTRACT: 
Egypt’s revolution of January 25, 2011 was impelled by a desire to 
eliminate “conventional corruption,” a particular kind of corruption that 
occurs when government officials illegally abuse public office for 
private gain.  Illegal quid pro quo transactions, including acts of 
bribery, are prominent examples of conventional corruption.  This form 
of corruption is to be contrasted with “unconventional corruption,” a 
form of corruption that has (thus far) been absent in Egypt.  
Unconventional corruption occurs when elected officials put personal 
campaign finances ahead of the public interest without engaging in a 
quid pro quo transaction.  These different forms, conventional and 
unconventional corruption, are not necessarily exhaustive of the 
universe of corruption.  However, classification of corruption in these 
terms serves a purpose: when conventional corruption decreases, there 
is often a correlating increase in unconventional corruption.  This 
relationship is relevant for purposes of analyzing corruption in Egypt 
because Egypt’s new constitution, although imperfect, provides for 
greater restraints on executive power, and thus, in turn provides a 
foundation for a reduction in conventional corruption.  However, as a 
result, problems of unconventional corruption are likely to emerge.  
Fortunately, unconventional corruption is not an inevitable side effect 
of progress—it can be contained.  With a certain bit of insight and 
courage, the people of Egypt can reform their campaign finance system 
and bring forth a true democracy—one where elected officials make 
decisions not for the benefit of potential political funders, but rather, for 
the benefit of the people. 
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When a republic has been corrupted, none of the ills that arise can be 
remedied except by removing the corruption and recalling the 
principles; every other correction is either useless or a new ill. 
- Charles de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Egypt’s revolution of January 25, 2011 was the result of many 
factors.  One factor was government corruption.  More specifically, it 
was “conventional corruption,” which occurs when government 
officials illegally abuse public office for private gain.  Illegal quid pro 
quo transactions, including acts of bribery, are prominent examples of 
conventional corruption.  This form of corruption is to be contrasted 
with “unconventional corruption,” a form of corruption that has (thus 
far) been absent in Egypt.  Unconventional corruption occurs when 
elected officials put personal campaign finances ahead of the public 
interest.  Although unconventional corruption does not involve an 
illegal quid pro quo transaction, it does involve corrupt decision-
making that is undertaken with the purpose of serving political funders 
instead of the people.  
 
Unconventional corruption, in contrast to its conventional 
counterpart, is not always recognized as a form of corruption.  Thus, 
unconventional corruption requires a more detailed explanation.  The 
unconventional corrupt act is not the spending of money by private 
parties.  Rather, it is the elected official’s decision to act with the 
purpose of inducing such spending by private parties.  Unconventional 
corruption is not a problem of gratitude; it is problem of incentive—the 
wrong incentive.  Instead of making decisions with the incentive of 
serving the public interest, elected officials make decisions with the 
incentive of benefiting from future campaign contributions and 
expenditures.  
 
These different forms, conventional and unconventional 
corruption, are not necessarily exhaustive of the universe of corruption.  
Nonetheless, classification of corruption in these terms serves a 
purpose due to their shared relationship—when conventional corruption 
decreases, there is a correlating increase in unconventional corruption.  
One aspect of this relationship involves the increased supply of 
campaign contributions and expenditures from private parties: when 
conventional corruption decreases and bribe offering because less 
effective, campaign contributions and expenditures become alternative 
tools of influence.  Another aspect of this relationship involves the 
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increased demand for campaign contributions and expenditures from 
elected officials: when measures to combat conventional corruption are 
implemented and elected officials can no longer illegally steal elections 
or divert public monies to fund their campaigns, such officials become 
eager to benefit from contributions and expenditures.  Thus, once a 
country takes concrete steps to reduce conventional corruption, it must 
then focus on combating unconventional corruption. 
 
This article analyzes conventional and unconventional 
corruption in the context of Egypt’s remarkable past, its tumultuous 
present, and its hopeful future.  Part I elaborates on the concepts of 
conventional and unconventional corruption.  Part II catalogs Egypt’s 
history of conventional corruption.  Part III describes Egypt’s 
revolution of January 25, 2011 as well as the uprising of June 30, 2013, 
which has been described as a revolution, counter-revolution, and/or 
military coup d’état.  Part IV analyzes Egypt’s new constitution and its 
potential impact on conventional corruption.  Part V explains why 
Egypt could experience a rise in unconventional corruption.  Part VI 
details what can be done to combat a rise in unconventional corruption. 
 
II. CONVENTIONAL AND UNCONVENTIONAL 
CORRUPTION 
 
Government corruption is commonly defined as the abuse of 
public office for private gain.1  Within this broad definition, corruption 
                                                     
? The content of this article is current as of January 1, 2014.  This 
article was presented at the International Law Weekend Conference at 
Fordham University School of Law on a panel titled “Towards a 
Culture of Accountability: A New Dawn for Egypt” on October 27, 
2012 and at the ASCL Younger Comparativists Committee New 
Voices in Comparative Law Conference at Indiana University Robert 
H. McKinney School of Law on April 19, 2013.  The authors thank 
Ronald Brand, Ahmed Eldakak, Haider Ala Hamoudi, and Ian 
Hartshorn for reviewing earlier drafts of this article.  The views 
expressed, along with any errors, are to be attributed only to the 
authors. 
1 Peter J. Henning, Public Corruption: A Comparative Analysis of 
International Corruption Conventions and United States Law, 18 ARIZ. 
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 793, 802-03 (2001) (“Professor [Bruce] Gronbeck, 
a linguist gave a straightforward definition, that ‘the term political 
corruption’ encompasses those acts whereby private gain is made at 
public expense.’  Professor [Abraham] Eisenstadt, a historian, offered a 
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exists in different forms.  One specific form is “conventional 
corruption,” which occurs when government officials illegally abuse 
public office for private gain.2  Illegal quid pro quo transactions, 
including acts of bribery, are examples of conventional corruption.3  
Perhaps the most notorious form of conventional corruption is the 
illegal theft of an election.4   
 
Conventional corruption can be further broken down into two 
basic kinds: grand corruption and petty corruption.5  Grand corruption 
involves theft or misuse of vast amounts of public resources by 
government officials.6  This kind of corruption most often originates 
with high-level officials who recognize and exploit opportunities that 
are presented through government work.7  Petty corruption, on the 
other hand, involves isolated transactions by lower-level administrative 
bureaucrats who abuse their office by demanding bribes, diverting 
public funds, or awarding favors in return for personal considerations.8  
Although the individual corrupt transactions within a government’s 
bureaucratic cholesterol usually involve very little money, such 
                                                                                                          
similar description, that ‘[p]olitical corruption means that a public 
official has perverted the office entrusted to his care, that he has broken 
a public trust for private gain.’”); FAQs on Corruption, 
TRANSPARENCY INT’L, 
http://www.transparency.org/whoweare/organisation/faqs_on_corruptio
n#defineCorruption (last visited Sept. 13, 2013).    
2 M. Patrick Yingling, Conventional and Unconventional Corruption, 
51 DUQ. L. REV. 263, 266 (2013). 
3 Id. 
4 See id. at 273-74. 
5 Id. at 266. 
6 Anwar Shah, Tailoring the Fight Against Corruption to Country 
Circumstances, in PERFORMANCE ACCOUNTABILITY AND COMBATING 
CORRUPTION 233, 235 (Anwar Shah ed., 2007). 
7 James Thuo Gathii, Corruption and Donor Reforms: Expanding the 
Promises and Possibilities of the Rule of Law as an Anti-Corruption 
Strategy in Kenya, 14 CONN. J. INT’L L. 407, 412 (1999); Kimberly 
Ann Elliott, Corruption as an International Policy Problem: Overview 
and Recommendations, in CORRUPTION AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 
175, 178 (1997), 
http://www.piie.com/publications/chapters_preview/12/10ie2334.pdf.  
8 Gathii, supra note 7, at 412; Elliott, supra note 7, at 178.  
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transactions can, in the aggregate, involve a substantial amount of 
public resources.9  
 
In contrast to conventional corruption, “unconventional 
corruption” occurs when elected officials put personal campaign 
finances ahead of the public interest.10  Because it involves elected 
officials, unconventional corruption is unique to democratic forms of 
government11—at least in so far as corrupt governments can be 
classified as true democracies.12  Although frequently overlooked, this 
form of government corruption involves a decision-making process that 
can corrupt a democracy to its core.13 
 
Unconventional corruption is not necessarily illegal; many 
statutory prohibitions on “corruption” do not reach unconventionally 
corrupt acts.14  And, although academics sometimes define 
                                                     
9 Shah, supra note 6, at 231. 
10 Yingling, supra note 2, at 264, 267. 
11 Id. at 267. 
12 See Juliet Sorensen, Ideals Without Illusions: Corruption and the 
Future of a Democratic North Africa, 10 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 202, 
203 (2012) (“The absence of corruption alone does not engender 
democracy, but true democracy cannot exist where corruption 
thrives.”).  
13 Yingling, supra note 2, at 270. 
14 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2) (2006) (“Whoever . . . being a public 
official or person selected to be a public official, directly or indirectly, 
corruptly demands, seeks, receives, accepts, or agrees to receive or 
accept anything of value personally or for any other person or entity, in 
return for:  (A) being influenced in the performance of any official act; 
(B) being influenced to commit or aid in committing, or to collude in, 
or allow, any fraud, or make opportunity for the commission of any 
fraud, on the United States; or (C) being induced to do or omit to do 
any act in violation of the official duty of such official or person . . . 
shall be fined under this title or not more than three times the monetary 
equivalent of the thing of value, whichever is greater, or imprisoned for 
not more than fifteen years, or both, and may be disqualified from 
holding any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United States.”) 
(emphasis added); see also United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of 
California, 526 U.S. 398, 404-05 (1999) (“[F]or bribery, there must be 
a quid pro quo – a specific intent to give or receive something of value 
in exchange for an official act.”). 
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“corruption” to involve illegal activity,15 and courts sometimes assume 
that government power can only be corrupted through quid pro quo 
transactions,16 government corruption, as described here, does not 
require illegal activity or a quid pro quo transaction.17  Indeed, perhaps 
the most elusive and counterproductive form of corruption in some 
transition and developed countries is the unconventional form, which is 
often legal and does not require a coordinated agreement.18  
 
The underlying problem of unconventional corruption does 
not concern secret deals entered into pre-election.  Rather, the problem 
concerns incentives that are offered post-election.19  Similarly, the 
problematic effect of unconventional corruption is not necessarily ex-
post in that elected officials take a position on a particular issue 
because of past contributions and expenditures.  Instead, the 
problematic effect is ex-ante in that incumbent elected officials take a 
position on a particular issue with the hopes of benefiting from future 
contributions and expenditures.20  Elected officials know of past 
                                                     
15 See, e.g., ROBIN THEOBALD, CORRUPTION, DEVELOPMENT AND 
UNDERDEVELOPMENT 15 (1990) (recognizing the difficulties in 
defining corruption but ultimately concluding that corruption is best 
defined as “the illegal use of public office for private gain”); Jakob 
Svensson, Eight Questions about Corruption, J. ECON. PERSP. 19, 20 
(Summer 2005) (“A common definition of public corruption is the 
misuse of public office for private gain.  Misuse, of course, typically 
involves applying a legal standard.”); cf. RALPH KETCHUM, FRAMED 
FOR POSTERITY 58 (1993) (stating that the universally understood 
meaning of “corruption” is “the opposite of the public good”). 
16 See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 357 (2010) 
(interpreting the U.S. Constitution and finding a government interest in 
combating only “quid pro quo corruption”). 
17 Henning, supra note 1, at 794 (“At a fundamental level, the term 
‘corruption’ does not denote any particular transgression, and need not 
even be conduct that would constitute a crime.”). 
18 Yingling, supra note 2, at 268. 
19 Id. (citing Samuel Issacharoff, On Political Corruption, in MONEY, 
POLITICS, AND THE CONSTITUTION, BEYOND CITIZENS UNITED 119, 124 
(Monica Youn ed., 2011)). 
20 Yingling, supra note 2, at 268. 
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contributions and the possibility of future ones from the interested 
parties.21 
 
There is a coherent and sensible argument to be made that 
money in the form of campaign contributions and expenditures merely 
buys speech that helps persuade voters to side with one candidate over 
another, and that private campaign contributions and expenditures are 
essential for a properly functioning democracy.  The problem of 
unconventional corruption, however, is not about what the money does.  
Rather, it is about what has to be done in order to secure the money.  
The money does not necessarily contradict democratic principles.  
What must be done to secure the money, however, can corrupt a 
democracy to its core.22  
  
Although unconventional corruption has, thus far, not been a 
factor that has hampered Egyptians’ pursuit of democracy, this form of 
corruption is not merely theoretical; it exists in various countries, and 
one in particular: the United States.23  There are a number of policy 
issues that perpetually go unsolved in the United States due to 
unconventional corruption.  These unsolved issues include a financial 
system composed of irrational incentives,24 nutrition standards that 
promote obesity,25 and firearms laws (or lack thereof) that fail to reflect 
the public will.26  These unsolved issues are not necessarily the result 
                                                     
21 LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST 121 (2011) (citing Daniel Hays 
Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Reform: The Root of All Evil is 
Deeply Rooted, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 301, 325 (1989)). 
22 Yingling, supra note 2, at 270 (citing LESSIG, supra note 21, at 161-
62). 
23 Yingling, supra note 2, at 286-90.  
24 Id. at 286-88 (citing LESSIG, supra note 21, at 188-89). 
25 Yingling, supra note 2, at 288-89. 
26 Frank Newport, Americans Wanted Gun Background Checks to Pass 
Senate, GALLUP (Apr. 29, 2013), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/162083/americans-wanted-gun-
background-checks-pass-senate.aspx (“Sixty-five percent of Americans 
say the U.S. Senate should have passed the measure that would have 
expanded background checks for gun purchases, while 29% agree with 
the Senate’s failure to pass the measure.”); Votes on Manchin-Toomey 
Amendment, OPENSECRETS.ORG, Apr. 18, 2013, 
http://www.opensecrets.org/news/issues/guns/vote_2013.php (last 
visited Sept. 14, 2013) (“On April 17th, 2013, members of the US 
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of backward morals or conventional corruption, such as bribery; rather, 
they are the result of unconventional corruption—elected officials 
making decisions with the purpose of being rewarded (in a non-quid 
pro quo fashion) with future campaign financing, regardless of whether 
the elected officials believe those decisions to be in the public interest.  
Thus, in the United States, unconventional corruption is, perhaps 
ironically, not so unconventional.27 
  
These different forms, conventional and unconventional 
corruption, are not exhaustive of the universe of corruption.  For 
example, academics often consider nepotism (or wasta, as loosely 
translated in Arabic) to be a form of corruption.28  However, unless 
acts of nepotism are accomplished through a public official’s illegal 
act, they are neither acts of conventional nor unconventional 
                                                                                                          
Senate voted on the Manchin-Toomey amendment, which would have 
required background checks on all commercial sales of guns.  The vote 
failed, with 54 members in support and 46 in opposition.  Nearly all of 
the members who voted against the amendment have received 
substantial amounts of money from the political action committees of 
gun rights groups, including the National Rifle Association.”).  
27 Yingling, supra note 2, at 267-68 (“The label ‘unconventional’ does 
not imply that this form of corruption occurs less frequently than 
conventional corruption; instead, the label ‘unconventional’ reflects the 
fact that because acts of unconventional corruption are not necessarily 
illegal, courts and academics often assume that government power can 
only be corrupted through traditionally illegal activities, such as quid 
pro quo transactions.”).  
28 See, e.g., Phillip M. Nichols, George J. Siedel, Matthew Kasdin, 
Corruption as a Pan-Cultural Phenomenon: An Empirical Study in 
Countries at Opposite Ends of the Former Soviet Empire, 39 TEX. 
INT’L L. J. 215, 244 (2004) (citing SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, 
CORRUPTION: A STUDY IN POLITICAL ECONOMY 4 (1978)) (referring to 
nepotism as a form of corruption); JOHN R. BRADLEY, INSIDE EGYPT: 
THE ROAD TO REVOLUTION IN THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS 154-55 
(2012) (discussing wasta under a chapter on “corruption”); see also 
Lawrence Rosen, Understanding Corruption, THE AMERICAN 
INTEREST, at 82 (Spring 2010), http://www.the-american-
interest.com/pdf/v5/n4/Rosen.pdf (quoting ROBERT B. CUNNINGHAM & 
YASIN K. SARAYAH, WASTA: THE HIDDEN FORCE IN THE MIDDLE 
EASTERN SOCIETY 1, 4, 6 (1993) (opining that “wasta includes, but is 
broader than, corruption” and that some wasta acts are legal while 
others are illegal)). 
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corruption.  Despite their combined non-exhaustive nature, 
classification of corruption in these terms serves a purpose due to their 
shared relationship—when conventional corruption decreases, there is a 
correlating increase in unconventional corruption.29  One aspect of this 
relationship involves the increased supply of campaign contributions 
and expenditures from private parties: when conventional corruption 
decreases and bribe offering becomes less effective, contributions and 
expenditures become alternative tools of influence.30  Another aspect 
of this relationship involves the increased demand for campaign 
contributions and expenditures from elected officials: when measures 
to combat conventional corruption are implemented and elected 
officials can no longer illegally steal elections or divert public monies 
to fund their campaigns, such officials become eager to obtain 
campaign contributions and expenditures.31  Therefore, as is argued 
below in our country-specific analysis of Egypt,32 once a country takes 
concrete steps to reduce conventional corruption, it must then focus on 
combating unconventional corruption.33   
 
III. THE HISTORY OF CONVENTIONAL CORRUPTION 
IN EGYPT 
 
After years of perceived corruption and injustice under British 
occupation,34 Egypt, in 1919, started a move to independence with 
Muslims and Christian Copts joining forces to instigate a popular 
revolution.35  This uprising resulted in nominal independence for Egypt 
                                                     
29 Yingling, supra note 2, at 270-71. 
30 See Nauro F. Campos and Francesco Giovannoni, Lobbying, 
Corruption, and Political Influence, 131 PUB. CHOICE 1, 2-3 (2007) 
(finding that lobbying activities, which include campaign contributions 
and expenditures, are an important alternative tool of influence when 
bribe offering becomes less effective). 
31 Yingling, supra note 2, at 270-71. 
32 See infra Parts V & VI. 
33 Yingling, supra note 2, at 271. 
34 See TAREK OSMAN, EGYPT ON THE BRINK, FROM NASSER TO 
MUBARAK 24-25 (2010); BRUCE K. RUTHERFORD, EGYPT AFTER 
MUBARAK: LIBERALISM, ISLAM, AND DEMOCRACY IN THE ARAB 
WORLD 35 (new introduction ed. 2012) (discussing corruption in Egypt 
under British occupation). 
35 Mohamed A. ‘Arafa, Towards a Culture for Accountability: A New 
Dawn for Egypt, 5 PHOENIX L. REV. 1, 8 (2011); M. Cherif Bassiouni, 
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in 1922, which was followed by the first post-independence 
constitution in 1923.36  With the implementation of the constitution, 
Egypt became a constitutional monarchy in which certain executive 
powers were held by the government, which was answerable to a 
nationally elected parliament.37  
 
Under the constitutional monarchy, Egypt experienced 
economic development through advances in industry and infrastructure, 
as well as through exposure to international markets.38  However, the 
benefits of such development were generally confined to the wealthiest 
members of Egyptian society; the country’s middle class grew at a very 
slow pace.39  As Egyptians became more aware of this situation, King 
Farouk, the head of the Egyptian state, became ensnared in multiple 
incidents of conventional corruption.40  Specifically, in 1951, he 
accepted a bribe in return for dissolving the government.41  In addition, 
the king’s name was mentioned in investigations pertaining to the 
illegal procurement of weapons for the Egyptian army during the 1948 
war with Israel.42  The state of the economy and the monarchy’s 
corrupt misuses of power led to the revolution of July 23, 1952,43 also 
known as the Free Officers’ Revolution, and the eventual abolishment 
of the constitutional monarchy.44  Although the Free Officers’ 
                                                                                                          
The Fight for Democracy in Egypt’s Liberation Square, CHI. COUNCIL 
ON GLOBAL AFF. 1 (Feb. 10, 2011), 
http://www.thechicagocouncil.org/UserFiles/File/Events/FY%2011%2
0Events/02_February_11/EgyptBackgroundPaper110207.pdf; see 
generally KATHRIN NINA WIEDL, THE ROLE OF THE COPTS IN THE 
NATIONAL MOVEMENT IN EGYPT UNTIL THE 1919 REVOLUTION (2007). 
36 ‘Arafa, supra note 35, at 8; Bassiouni, supra note 35, at 2. 
37 OSMAN, supra note 34, at 25; Bassiouni, supra note 35, at 2. 
38 OSMAN, supra note 34, at 37. 
39 Id. at 37, 55; BRADLEY, supra note 28, at 54. 
40 See OSMAN, supra note 34, at 38; see also BRADLEY, supra note 28, 
at 31. 
41 OSMAN, supra note 34, at 38. 
42 Id. 
43 Bassiouni, supra note 35, at 2. 
44 National Integrity System Study Egypt 2009 (“NIS Study Egypt”), 
TRANSPARENCY INT’L 18 (2009), 
http://archive.transparency.org/publications/publications/nis_egypt_200
9. 
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Revolution was a military coup d’état, it was strongly embraced and 
reinforced by the people.45   
 
Lieutenant Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser was among the 
officers of the revolution.46  In the span of a few years, Nasser was able 
to sideline Egypt’s first president, Major General Mohammad Naguib, 
dissolve all political parties except for the Arab Socialist Union 
Party,47 and create a new constitutional order defined by a powerful 
presidency.48  As a result, there were few checks on Nasser’s political 
power.49  Presidential power was already significant before the 1958 
enactment of the Emergency Law, which gave the president the power 
to circumscribe non-governmental political activity.50  The Emergency 
Law would remain in effect for all but eighteen months between 1967 
and 2012.51  With executive power unrestrained and political activity 
greatly restricted, conventional corruption began to fester under Nasser 
as administrators and bureaucrats abused their power to prey on 
citizens and siphon off resources from the state.52 
 
Anwar Sadat ascended to the presidency after Nasser’s death 
in 1970.53  Sadat immediately backed a new constitution—the 1971 
Constitution—in what he promoted as an effort to restore greater 
                                                     
45 ‘Arafa, supra note 35, at 8; but see BRADLEY, supra note 28, at 27 
(describing the Free Officers as “hijack[ing] the popular unrest to seize 
power”). 
46 BRADLEY, supra note 28, at 12. 
47 Id. at 14; NIS Study Egypt, supra note 44, at 19. 
48 SELMA BOTMAN, EGYPT FROM INDEPENDENCE TO REVOLUTION, 
1919-1952 30-40 (1991); OSMAN, supra note 34, at 45. 
49 TAMIR MOUSTAFA, THE STRUGGLE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: 
LAW, POLITICS, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN EGYPT 59-60 (2007). 
50 Lisa Reynolds Wolfe, Cold War Legacy: Egypt’s Emergency Law 
162 of 1958 (Feb. 1, 2011), 
http://www.coldwarstudies.com/2011/02/01/cold-war-legacy-egypts-
emergency-law-162-of-1958/.  
51 Sarah El Deeb, Egypt Emergency Law Lapses, HUFFINGTON POST 
(May 31, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/31/egypt-
emergency-law-lapse_n_1559110.html.  
52 See MOUSTAFA, supra note 49, at 82-83. 
53 OSMAN, supra note 34, at 117. 
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democracy to Egypt.54  Sadat also dismantled the Arab Socialist Union 
Party and allowed previously banned political parties to re-enter 
political life.55  The new parties, however, entered political life under a 
tightly controlled process that was dominated by the executive 
branch.56  In the later years of Sadat’s presidency, despite the fact that 
Egyptian law prohibited acts of bribery and the like,57 there was a 
glaring increase in conventional corruption.58  Notably, vote rigging 
flourished and referenda typically resulted in 99% “yes” votes.59  
During this time, Egypt also experienced an emergence of parasitic 
links between sections of the public sector and private industry.60 
 
After Sadat’s assassination in 1981, Hosni Mubarak rose to 
the presidency,61 and the National Democratic Party (NDP), which was 
the only party represented in presidential elections until 2005,62 began 
its dominance of the political realm.63  Conventional corruption soared 
                                                     
54 James Feuille, Reforming Egypt’s Constitution: Hope for Egyptian 
Democracy?, 47 TEX. INT’L L. J. 237, 241-42 (2011). 
55 NIS Study Egypt, supra note 44, at 19-20. 
56 Sahar F. Aziz, Revolution Without Reform? A Critique of Egypt’s 
Election Laws, 45 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 1, 40 (2013); MOUSTAFA, 
supra note 49, at 90 (“But Sadat’s shift to a multiparty system was 
never intended to be a complete and comprehensive democratic 
transition.  Rather, it was to be a tightly controlled process of political 
liberalization that would give the appearance of free party competition 
with few concrete concessions from the regime.”). 
57 See, e.g., Egypt, Law No. 62 of 1975 (Illegal Profit-Making) Al-
Jarida Al-Rasmiyya [THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE], July 7, 1975; NIS Study 
Egypt, supra note 44, at 146 (“The Penal Code criminalises both active 
and passive bribery, as well as using public resources for private 
gain.”). 
58 See OSMAN, supra note 34, at 123. 
59 Feuille, supra note 54, at 242; MOUSTAFA, supra note 49, at 70. 
60 OSMAN, supra note 34, at 123; BRADLEY, supra note 28, at 45. 
61 Feuille, supra note 54, at 243. 
62 NIS Study Egypt, supra note 44, at 20. 
63 ‘Arafa, supra note 35, at 13; Inside Story: How Did Egypt Become So 
Corrupt?, AL JAZEERA (Feb. 7, 2011), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/insidestory/2011/02/201128111
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to extraordinary levels during Mubarak’s reign.64  Over this time, 
Transparency International reported a marked increase in the wasting of 
public resources, as well as embezzlement, bribery, and forgery.65  In 
addition, the parasitic links between the public and private sectors that 
emerged under Sadat only intensified under Mubarak.66  A small group 
of businessmen with close ties to the president’s son, Gamal Mubarak, 
gained enormous influence over the economy and began running it 
pursuant to their personal interests.67  Although these businessmen may 
have obtained their influence through technically legal means, their 
interests lied in maintaining a status quo that was defined by 
conventional corruption.68 
 
One very problematic aspect of the increase in conventional 
corruption was the executive’s willingness and ability to steal 
elections.69  As just one example, during the 1995 elections, electoral 
irregularities were widespread.70  The Independent Commission for 
Election Review reported that police stood by while representatives of 
opposition candidates were expelled or turned away from polling 
stations, ballot boxes arrived stuffed with voting papers, and polling 
stations were ransacked by paid thugs.71  
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based on the legacy of the ASU [Arab Socialist Union] including most 
of its old guard.”). 
64 See ‘Arafa, supra note 35, at 8; Bassiouni, supra note 35. 
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Under Mubarak, many facets of society openly and 
comprehensively discussed conventional corruption.72  The general 
public was fully aware of the costs of conventional corruption for the 
country’s political stability and the threat it posed to economic and 
social development.73  Despite such awareness, conventional 
corruption represented the ruling social law and a behavior that 
governed various aspects of Egyptian life.74 
 
IV. THE ARAB SPRING IN EGYPT:  A FIGHT AGAINST 
CONVENTIONAL CORRUPTION 
 
In an extraordinary set of events, popular protests in Tahrir 
Square (together with workers’ strikes on factory floors)75 provided the 
tipping point for a revolution.76  The date for initial protests, January 
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25, 2011, was deliberately chosen to coincide with Egypt’s National 
Police Day77—a day that once commemorated Egyptian freedom, but 
evolved to represent the deterioration of Egypt’s corrupt police 
forces.78  Conventional corruption played a significant role in 
motivating the January 25th revolution as well as other revolutions in 
the Middle East throughout Arab Spring.79  During the revolution, the 
popular chant outside of the NDP’s headquarters in el-Minya, 245 
kilometers south of Cairo, was “[c]orruption caused this country’s 
destruction!”80 
 
Egypt’s popular uprisings focused on the removal of the 
corrupt Mubarak regime.81  Mohamed ElBaradei, former head of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency and a well-known opposition 
leader in Egypt, expressly called for a military coup on his Twitter 
page.82  Meanwhile, Mubarak called on the military to intervene on his 
                                                     
77 Ozan O. Varol, The Democratic Coup D’Etat, 53 HARV. INT’L L. J. 
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EGYPT 21, 36 (Jeannie Sowers & Chris Toensing eds., 2012). 
81 ‘Arafa, supra note 35, at 13-15; Ursula Lindsey, Revolution and 
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(Jeannie Sowers & Chris Toensing eds., 2012). 
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behalf.83  Instead, on February 11, 2011, in what has been termed a 
“democratic coup d’etat,”84 the military issued a communiqué 
declaring that it was intervening to protect the country and “to sponsor 
the legitimate demands of the people.”85  Hours after the release of the 
communiqué, Mubarak’s Vice President, Omar Suleiman, announced 
that Mubarak had resigned his post and the Supreme Council of the 
Armed Forces (SCAF) had assumed power.86   
 
Mubarak was later convicted for complicity in the killing of 
protestors during the uprising and was sentenced to life in prison.87  
The conviction, however, has since been rejected and Mubarak will 
now face a retrial which could result in a different penalty or even 
acquittal.88  Mubarak and his sons, Gamal and Alaa, will also be tried 
on corruption charges for allegedly redirecting presidential palace 
renovation funds to be used on their own private residences.89  Many 
members of Mubarak’s regime have been sentenced to several years in 
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Mubarak, N.Y. TIMES, at A.1 (Jan. 14, 2013), 
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prison on charges of corruption, embezzlement of public funds, unjust 
enrichment, and peddling in influence.90 
 
Egypt’s transition to democracy took a big step forward when 
elections for the People’s Assembly, the lower house of parliament, 
began in November 2011 and continued in staggered rounds until 
January 2012.91  Nearly all political parties, except for Mubarak’s 
NDP, which was dissolved by Egypt’s High Administrative Court for 
monopolizing and manipulating elections, were allowed to freely 
establish themselves and participate in the post-revolution 
parliamentary elections.92  The Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and 
Justice Party emerged as the clear victor of the elections, obtaining 
47% of the seats in the People’s Assembly.93  Although the Supreme 
Constitutional Court dissolved the People’s Assembly only a few 
months later because election officials had impermissibly allowed 
political parties to compete for seats designated for independents,94 the 
elections were widely viewed as free and fair by independent 
monitoring organizations.95   
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Before the People’s Assembly was dissolved, however, it 
appointed 100 representatives to the Constituent Assembly to draft the 
post-revolution constitution.96  Like the People’s Assembly, the 
Constituent Assembly was dominated by Islamists.97  Soon thereafter, 
in June 2012, the Muslim Brotherhood continued its domination of 
electoral politics when, following an electoral run-off, Mohamed Morsi 
was declared Egypt’s first democratically elected president.98   
 
Morsi strongly asserted that he would curtail corruption in 
Egypt, and although little progress was made in the first few months of 
his presidency,99 polls showed that the majority of the Egyptian public 
had confidence in the national government.100  However, serious 
problems began to emerge for Morsi when he shifted his focus toward 
ensuring an abbreviated process for drafting a new constitution.  On 
November 22, 2012, in the midst of speculation as to whether the 
Constituent Assembly would be disbanded by the Supreme 
Constitutional Court, Morsi issued a declaration stating that the 
Constituent Assembly would not be subject to judicial oversight and 
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that he would have the “power to take all necessary measures and 
procedures” against any potential threat to the revolution.101  Shortly 
thereafter, the Constituent Assembly approved the draft of the new 
constitution,102 which was put to a two-round referendum vote on 
December 15th and 22nd of 2012 and approved by 63.8% of voters, 
amidst very low turnout.103  The 2012 Constitution increased 
separation of powers and restraints on the executive, but was criticized 
heavily for its lack of human rights protections and its deference to 
Islam in state affairs.104 
 
Egyptians’ early support of Morsi and the national 
government began to steadily decline in the wake of Morsi’s November 
declaration.105  Frequent power cuts, gas shortages, and security 
breaches added to the decline in Morsi’s popularity.106  In June 2013, 
Morsi blamed the country’s problems on Mubarak-era corruption that 
was, in his words, “greater than we had imagined.”107  This excuse, 
however, did not appease the Egyptian people.  On June 30, 2013, 
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millions of Egyptians began to demonstrate in Tahrir Square and 
elsewhere, calling for Morsi to step down.108  On July 1, 2013, Egypt’s 
military gave Morsi forty-eight hours to resolve the government’s 
disputes with the demonstrators or face a military solution.109  Finally, 
on July 3, 2013, General Abdul-Fattah el-Sisi led the military in 
removing Morsi from power, suspending the 2012 Constitution, and 
installing Adly Monsour, the Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Constitutional Court, as acting president.110  The military’s actions, 
although highly controversial, were celebrated by many Egyptians.111 
 
The military, along with Morsi’s political opposition, 
subsequently appointed ten legal experts to a committee tasked with 
making recommendations to a larger fifty-member committee for 
amending the 2012 Constitution.112  In August 2013, the committee of 
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ten proposed a draft that was generally viewed as an edit to the 2012 
Constitution.113  Aside from its proposed creation of a unicameral 
legislature, the draft largely retains the same separation of powers 
between the branches of government.114  The most significant changes 
pertain to the reduced role of Islam in state affairs.115 
 
V. COMBATING CONVENTIONAL CORRUPTION IN 
POST-REVOLUTION EGYPT 
 
In seeking solutions for conventional corruption, it is common 
for politicians and the general public to push for moral reform above all 
else.  However, appealing for moral reform in isolation from political 
and administrative reform prevents a clear understanding of the 
situation and distracts from the real causes of conventional 
corruption.116  Furthermore, even certain kinds of political and 
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administrative reform can be unhelpful if the foundations for reducing 
conventional corruption are not in place.  In this regard, even the best 
anti-corruption legislation will fail if implemented in a political 
environment that is not conducive to real scrutiny.117 
 
In order to curb conventional corruption, the people must, at a 
minimum, impose upon their government a separation of powers, 
complete with a system of checks and balances.118  As was stated by 
Charles de Montesquieu, whose bedrock ideas have been implemented 
throughout the world, “[s]o that one cannot abuse power, power must 
check power by the arrangement of things.”119  When powers are 
separated and limited, the government can effectively enact laws 
prohibiting government officials from abusing their office, enforce such 
laws, and impartially determine when the laws have been violated.120  
Friction in the form of checks must exist between the branches of 
government in order for the political environment to be open to real 
scrutiny.  This is especially true with regard to restraints on the 
executive.121 
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Real checks and balances were not totally absent from 
Mubarak’s Egypt.  For example, the 1971 Constitution gave the 
Supreme Constitutional Court the exclusive authority to determine the 
constitutionality of laws enacted by the other two branches.122  The 
1971 Constitution also guaranteed the independence of the judiciary,123 
along with tenure of office,124 so that judges would be protected from 
the whims of the executive.  And even though the 1971 Constitution 
allowed the president to appoint judges without the final consent of the 
legislature,125 the judiciary was perceived as one of the least corrupt 
public authorities in Egypt.126  In practice, the heads of the Court of 
Cassation, the High Administrative Court, and the Supreme 
Constitutional Court often declared electoral laws and other legislative 
procedures unconstitutional, thus indicating that the judiciary enjoyed a 
significant degree of independence.127 
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The 1971 Constitution also contained several mechanisms that 
sought to hold the executive accountable to the legislature.  For 
example, the former lower house of parliament, the People’s Assembly, 
could withdraw its confidence from any of the ministers or prime 
minister’s deputies through a motion by one-tenth of its members, 
followed by a majority vote of the entire assembly.128  The People’s 
Assembly was also entitled to form committees for the purpose of fact-
finding and conducting investigations into the activities of 
administrative bodies.129 
 
Unfortunately, unlike the judiciary’s mechanisms, the 
legislature’s mechanisms were rarely exercised in full.130  There was a 
wide gap between de jure and de facto accountability in Egypt,131 
especially with regard to the legislature’s checks on the executive.  
Opposition parties in the People’s Assembly struggled to play an 
effective role in combating conventional corruption.132  This was 
primarily due to the restrictions on their activities imposed by the 
Emergency Law,133 which permitted, among other things, arbitrary 
arrests and searches, indefinite detention without trial, heightened 
censorship, and restraints on the gathering of more than five people at 
any one time,134 thus giving Egyptian authorities and the NDP the 
                                                                                                          
position”); Aziz, supra note 56, at 15 (noting that, unfortunately, “the 
executive branch sought to use the judiciary’s reputation and prestige to 
validate sham elections”). 
128 ABROGATED CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 11 
Sept. 1971, as amended, May 22, 1980, May 25, 2005, March 26, 
2007, art. 126. 
129 Id. at art. 131. 
130 NIS Study Egypt, supra note 44, at 11. 
131 Id. at 13. 
132 Id. at 27.  For further details on the struggles of opposition parties to 
combat corruption in Egypt, see MOHAMED A. ‘ARAFA, TOWARDS A 
NEW ANTI-CORRUPTION LAW IN EGYPT AFTER MUBARAK: A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES FOREIGN 
CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT, EGYPTIAN ANTI-BRIBERY LAW, AND 
ISLAMIC LAW (2013). 
133 NIS Study Egypt, supra note 44, at 11-12. 
134 Varol, supra note 77, at 341-42; Mona El-Ghobashy, Unsettling the 
Authorities: Constitutional Reform in Egypt, in THE JOURNEY TO 
TAHRIR, REVOLUTION, PROTEST, AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN EGYPT 122, 
127 (Jeannie Sowers & Chris Toensing eds., 2012). 
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ability to circumvent many legal and political checks on executive 
power.135  The regime made full use of its Emergency Law privileges, 
particularly during election season.136  As a result, the NDP constituted 
an overwhelming majority in parliament, which allowed the party to 
continually drown out opposition voices.137   
 
With the January 25th revolution, Egypt gained a rare 
opportunity to repair the fundamentals of its governance system and 
combat conventional corruption.  Many Egyptians had high hopes for a 
new constitution.  For some, these high hopes turned to disappointment 
when the Constituent Assembly released the final draft of the 2012 
Constitution.138  However, even though the 2012 Constitution includes 
a questionable deference to religion in state affairs139 and less reform 
on individual rights than many had hoped for, the reality is that, when 
measured against the Egyptian constitutional tradition, the new text 
brings forth a number of improvements to the governance system and is 
not the catastrophe that many have identified.140 
 
First, the 2012 Constitution includes many of the positive 
aspects of the 1971 Constitution.  Judicial independence and security of 
                                                     
135 BRADLEY, supra note 28, at 56. 
136 MOUSTAFA, supra note 49, at 95. 
137 El-Ghobashy, supra note 134, at 147. 
138 David D. Kirkpatrick, Egyptian Islamists Approve Draft Constitution 
Despite Objections, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/30/world/middleeast/panel-drafting-
egypts-constitution-prepares-quick-vote.html.  
139 See CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, Dec. 26, 
2012, arts. 2, 4, & 219; Marc Lynch, The Battle for Egypt’s 
Constitution, PROJECT ON MIDDLE EAST POLITICAL SCIENCE 4 (Jan. 11, 
2013), http://pomeps.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/01/POMEPS_BriefBooklet17_Egypt_web.pdf.  
140 Zaid Al-Ali, The New Egyptian Constitution: An Initial Assessment 
of its Merits and Flaws, OPEN DEMOCRACY (Dec. 26, 2012), 
http://www.opendemocracy.net/zaid-al-ali/new-egyptian-constitution-
initial-assessment-of-its-merits-and-flaws; Shadi Hamid, Is There an 
Egyptian Nation?, in THE BATTLE FOR EGYPT’S CONSTITUTION, 
PROJECT ON MIDDLE EAST POLITICAL SCIENCE 25 (Jan. 11, 2013), 
http://pomeps.org/wp-
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tenure for judges is protected.141 Also, the Supreme Constitutional 
Court is still exclusively competent to review the constitutionality of 
laws, giving it the ability to check the other branches.142  And, with 
respect to the legislature, individual legislators have the right to request 
information, demand a statement from the government, or even 
interrogate the prime minister in relation to urgent matters of public 
importance.143  
 
The 2012 Constitution also imposes new limits on the 
executive.  For example, while the president previously served a six-
year term without term limits,144 the president shall now be elected 
every four years and may only be re-elected once.145  Also, the 
constitution provides stronger restrictions on the president’s power to 
call a state of emergency and on the president’s powers during that 
period.146  In addition, whereas the president previously faced few 
obstacles in dissolving the parliament,147 he may now only do so 
pursuant to a public referendum.148  The current version of the 
constitution even stipulates that if the referendum fails, then the 
president must resign;149 however, proposed amendments contemplate 
the removal of this stipulation.150   
                                                     
141 CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, Dec. 26, 2012, 
arts. 168, 170. 
142 Id. at art. 175. 
143 Id. at arts. 123-25. 
144 ABROGATED CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 11 
Sept. 1971, as amended, May 22, 1980, May 25, 2005, March 26, 
2007, art. 77. 
145 Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 26 Dec. 2012, art. 133. 
146 Id. at art. 148; see also Mabrouk, supra note 104, at 5 (“[T]he 
president’s authority to declare a state of emergency has been hobbled; 
it has to be approved by a majority of both houses.”). 
147 El-Ghobashy, supra note 134, at 143. 
148 CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 26 Dec. 2012, art. 
127. 
149 Id.; see also Holger Albrecht, Unbalancing Power in Egypt’s 
Constitution, FOREIGN POLICY (Jan. 31, 2013), 
http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/01/31/unbalancing_power
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allows the president to move to dissolve parliament through a popular 
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The 2012 Constitution also imposes new legislative checks on 
the executive branch.  Parliament is now empowered to dismiss the 
government, the prime minister, or any individual minister by a simple 
majority of its members.151  In contrast, under the 1971 Constitution, 
the parliament could only dismiss the government after obtaining the 
president’s approval or a two-thirds majority vote.152  In addition, the 
2012 Constitution puts forth a method for the House of 
Representatives, the new lower house of parliament, to impeach the 
president by a two-thirds majority, after which the president shall be 
tried before a special court composed of heads of the judiciary.153  
  
Although the 2012 Constitution embodies an improvement 
with respect to the division of power in Egypt, it is by no means 
perfect.  To note just a couple of deficiencies, the constitution provides 
no legislative check on the president’s power to appoint judges at the 
highest levels and also fails to set forth any procedures for determining 
judicial salaries.154  Another caveat is the Egyptian military, which in 
its efforts to maintain order until a new government is elected has 
shown a willingness to disregard power structures and the rights of 
                                                                                                          
vote, a provision that might come as a necessary step to solve a 
deadlock between the two institutions.  Yet, an important clause has 
been introduced in order to impede the article’s abuse: losing the 
popular referendum triggers the automatic resignation of the 
president.”).  
150 PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB 
REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 20 Aug. 2013, art. 112, 
http://www.constitutionnet.org/files/2013.08.20_-
_proposed_changes_to_2012_constitution_expert_committee_idea_eng
lish.pdf; Bassem Sabry, 22 Key Points in Egypt’s New Draft 
Constitution, Al-Monitor (Aug. 23, 2013), http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/08/egypt-draft-constitution-
guide.html.  
151 CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 26 Dec. 2012, art. 
126. 
152 ABROGATED CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 11 
Sept. 1971, as amended, May 22, 1980, May 25, 2005, March 26, 
2007, art. 127. 
153 CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 26 Dec. 2012, art. 
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those who oppose its actions.155  However, even though the 
constitution is imperfect, and the transition has been chaotic, there is 
hope for a future Egypt with less conventional corruption.  If Egypt is 
able to hold free and fair elections in 2014 and emerge with a party in 
power facing unprecedented scrutiny due to a newly relevant political 
opposition and a constitution that limits the powers of the 
presidency,156 then Egypt will at least have a chance of succeeding in 
its fight against conventional corruption. 
 
VI. THE LIKELY RISE OF UNCONVENTIONAL 
CORRUPTION IN EGYPT 
 
Unfortunately, measures aimed at combating conventional 
corruption do not also solve problems of unconventional corruption.157  
In fact, when conventional corruption declines, a rise in unconventional 
corruption is usually on the horizon.158  Unconventional corruption, in 
this regard, is an unfortunate side effect of necessary reforms to combat 
conventional corruption.  Although the occurrence of unconventional 
corruption can thus be an indicator of progress, unconventional 
corruption is not a necessary evil for a democracy that has recently 
implemented measures to combat conventional corruption.  As 
described below, there are solutions that can and should be 
implemented to combat unconventional corruption.  
 
There are two specific reasons why Egypt could be susceptible 
to a rise in unconventional corruption in the coming years.  The first is 
a likely increase in the supply of campaign contributions and 
expenditures.  If reforms focused on reducing conventional corruption 
are successful, private parties who are accustomed to getting their way 
through acts of bribery and the like will be forced to seek alternative 
means of achieving their objectives, and these alternative means are 
                                                     
155 See Mayy El Sheikh and Kareem Fahim, Dozens Are Killed in Street 
Violence Across Egypt, N.Y Times (Oct. 6, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/07/world/middleeast/clashes-in-
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likely to include campaign contributions and expenditures.159  In 
addition, many individuals who once flaunted near complete control of 
the economy may find it necessary to utilize campaign contributions 
and expenditures in order to wield the kind of influence that they 
brandished under Mubarak.160 
 
The second reason why Egypt is susceptible to an increase in 
unconventional corruption is a likely increase in the demand for 
campaign contributions and expenditures.  While a ruling party 
incumbent of the past may have been able to rely on the ultimate act of 
conventional corruption—stealing an election—to stay in power, 
incumbents will now be required to communicate with their 
constituencies to keep their support, and this requires financing.161  
Furthermore, due to the events of the last few years, ruling party 
incumbents can no longer safely forgo actual campaigns with the 
expectation that the state-run media will dominate the landscape and 
communicate the incumbent’s re-election message to the public. 
 
To elaborate on this last point, the Mubarak regime was able 
to use the state-run media in a way that made it unnecessary for NDP 
incumbents to seek contributions and expenditures from outside parties 
in order to run comprehensive campaigns.162  The NDP mobilized the 
                                                     
159 See Campos & Giovannoni, supra note 30, at 2 (concluding that 
lobbying activities are an important alternative tool of influence when 
bribe offering becomes less effective). 
160 See ASWANY, supra note 67, at vii. 
161 See Ahmed Feteha, The Best Democracy Money Can Buy: Funding 
Egypt’s Presidential Campaigns, AHRAM ONLINE (Mar. 31, 2012), 
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/3/12/38063/Business/Econo
my/The-best-democracy-money-can-buy-Funding-Egypts-pr.aspx 
(“According to [Professor] Abdel Aziz, campaign activities fall into 
two categories: promotion in the mass media, and round-level activities 
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162 Sharif Abdel Kouddous, After Mubarak: Fighting For Press 
Freedom in Egypt, THE NATION (June 20, 2011), 
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state-run media to serve its own interests by promoting party policies 
and exaggerating achievements, all while excluding coverage of other 
parties.163  As recently as the 2010 parliamentary elections, the state-
run media showed a marked interest in giving positive coverage to state 
figures.164  The Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies found that, 
without exception, all of the state-owned newspapers exhibited a clear 
pro-NDP bias in their election coverage.165  The state television 
channels were also biased.  For example, on Channel 2, in the lead up 
to the election, the NDP received 56.6% of the coverage (71% positive 
and 1% negative).  In contrast, the Muslim Brotherhood received only 
10% of the coverage (2% positive and 92% negative).166 
 
However, this situation has changed, and will continue to 
change, because contemporary digital technology has destroyed much 
of the government’s capacity to monopolize the means of broadcast 
communication.167  Technology, besides facilitating the rise of web-
based blogs and social media, has been an impetus for private and 
independent news journalism.168  Even under Mubarak and the NDP, 
state media organs were already losing ground to private upstarts such 
as Al-Masry Al-Youm and Al-Shorouk.169  The private media gained a 
firm foothold on the Egyptian media landscape, and although it has not 
been completely immune from government influence or eliminated the 
                                                                                                          
(“The Egyptian government, which inherited a vast state apparatus, has 
been in total control of state resources, mass media outlets and legal 
channels for political participation.  This diminishes any possibility for 
real and substantial competition.”). 
163 CAIRO INSTITUTE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS STUDIES (“CIHRS”), Media 
and Parliamentary Elections in Egypt:  Evaluation of Media 
Performance in Parliamentary Elections (Oct. 28/Dec. 15, 2010), at 76; 
Eldakak, supra note 69, at 289-92; MOUSTAFA, supra note 49, at 96. 
164 CIHRS, supra note 163, at 9.  
165 Id. at 39. 
166 Id. at 70. 
167 See generally KAYLAN GEIGER & FRAUS MASRI, THE RED LINE: 
PRESS FREEDOM IN POST-MUBARAK EGYPT (2012). 
168 JEFFREY C. ALEXANDER, PERFORMATIVE REVOLUTION IN EGYPT: AN 
ESSAY IN CULTURAL POWER 69 (2011); see also Eldakak, supra note 
69, at 289 (explaining that the rise of privately owned independent 
media was also caused by the state-run media’s lack of credibility). 
169 ASHRAF KHALIL, LIBERATION SQUARE: INSIDE THE EGYPTIAN 
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state-run media’s bias, partiality, and prejudice,170 it has reduced it in 
significant ways.171  With the growth of private media, including well-
known satellite channels, elected ruling-party officials can no longer 
rely on the dominance and bias of the state-run media to communicate 
their messages in lieu of conducting actual campaigns that require vast 
sums of money. 
 
Even if the government attempts to censor private media, as 
the military-controlled post-Morsi government has done,172 such 
efforts are unlikely to return the state-run media to the position of 
influence that it once held.  Cracks are emerging in the once rigid walls 
of the state-run media not only because of private media, but also 
because of pure economic inertia.173  The state media machine, like 
most public sector enterprises in Egypt, is significantly overstaffed with 
thousands of phantom employees who draw a paycheck for barely 
working.174  The combination of declining readership and viewers, 
along with the immense economic drain associated with supporting the 
propaganda machine, will eventually cause the state-run media to 
change its ways.175  Thus, ruling-party incumbents will not be able to 
safely forgo actual campaigns with the expectation that the state-run 
media will dominate the political landscape in a biased manner and 
communicate the incumbent’s re-election message to the public. 
 
One factor that could potentially mitigate an increase in 
demand for campaign financing is Egypt’s new electoral system.  Prior 
to the January 25th revolution, members of parliament were elected 
under a plurality (winner-take-all) system, in which Egyptians voted for 
individual candidates.176  In contrast, Egypt has recently experimented 
with electing legislators under a “mixed system,” in which only one-
third of the parliament is elected on a plurality basis, while the other 
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two-thirds are elected on a closed party list basis, whereby voters select 
parties instead of individual candidates.177  Candidates elected on a 
plurality basis have a heightened incentive to personally differentiate 
themselves from their competitors,178 which is accomplished more 
easily with the help of campaign contributions and expenditures.  In 
contrast, candidates elected on a closed party-list basis do not have the 
same incentive to personally differentiate themselves from their 
competitors,179 and thus, candidates elected on such a basis are 
presumably less incentivized to seek campaign financing.  As a result, 
the existence of a mixed system, whereby two-thirds of the legislators 
are elected on a closed party list basis, may mitigate the previously 
mentioned causes of an increased demand for campaign financing.180  
However, the ten-member committee tasked with making 
recommendations for amendments to the 2012 Constitution has 
proposed returning to the plurality system for Egypt’s next 
parliamentary elections.181  Even if this proposal is not accepted by the 
larger committee and the mixed system remains in place, the mixed 
system’s potential mitigating effect does not apply to the one-third of 
                                                     
177 Gamal Essam El-Din, Egypt’s Shura Council Approves New House 
of Representatives Law, AHRAM ONLINE (Apr. 11, 2013), 
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legislators who will be running independent of the party system.  For 
these legislators, the causes of increased demand for campaign 
financing are unmitigated. 
 
Unfortunately, Egypt lacks a comprehensive framework for 
regulating campaign financing with respect to independent candidates 
in parliamentary elections.182  Thus, the country does not currently 
have the tools to preempt a rise in unconventional corruption.  The 
most problematic aspect of this situation is that Egypt’s laws pertaining 
to campaign finance do not include any disclosure requirements for 
parties or candidates.183  Egypt’s current campaign finance rules for 
lower house elections can be found in Law 38 of 1972.184  Besides 
lacking disclosure requirements, Law 38 also lacks any meaningful 
restrictions on domestic campaign contributions or independent 
expenditures by private parties.185  Instead, Article 11 of Law 38 
restricts the expenditures of the candidates themselves; candidates must 
comply with a specific ceiling for expenditures that is set for each 
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election.186  In essence, under the current framework, domestic private 
parties are permitted to contribute and spend unlimited amounts of 
money to benefit election campaigns, which, in turn, provides elected 
officials with incentives for engaging in unconventional corruption, 
without any way for the public to gauge the elected official’s 
susceptibility to such corruption. 
 
VII. COMBATING A RISE IN UNCONVENTIONAL 
CORRUPTION IN POST-REVOLUTION EGYPT 
 
Unconventional corruption is not a necessary evil for a 
transitioning democracy that has recently implemented measures to 
combat conventional corruption.  The solution, however, is not to 
prohibit unconventional corruption with positive laws.  Because 
unconventional corruption does not involve a coordinated quid pro quo 
transaction, it is rather difficult to prove in any particular instance.  
Furthermore, laws prohibiting acts of unconventional corruption could 
give executive branch prosecutors the means to bring trumped up 
charges against political adversaries based on a subjective view of what 
is, and what is not, in the public interest.187  Instead, a more 
appropriate method of combating unconventional corruption is to 
provide transparency and limit the incentives for unconventional 
corruption, i.e., restrict the amounts of contributions and expenditures 
that private parties can make to benefit an election campaign.   
 
The first step towards combating unconventional corruption is 
to establish rules that require elected officials to periodically disclose 
information pertaining to campaign contributions.188  The public is 
entitled to information pertaining to who gives money, to whom is it 
allocated, and for what purpose.189  Reports on contributions should 
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not be limited to the eyes of a government oversight body; instead, the 
public should be able to access such reports without having to make 
specific requests.190   Vulnerable sections of society are often fearful of 
making information requests, but if the reports are published online or 
otherwise, then everyone can access them anonymously.191  
  
 With proper disclosure rules, the voting public gains 
necessary access to information that may be indicative of an elected 
official’s tendencies to act against the public interest.192  Transparency 
has a curative effect on the process of campaign funding that 
diminishes the incentive for unconventional corruption.193  In this 
regard, Article 7(3) of the United Nations Convention Against 
Corruption, which Egypt ratified in 2005, states that each party to the 
convention shall “consider taking appropriate legislative and 
administrative measures . . . to enhance transparency in the funding of 
candidatures for elected public office and, where applicable, the 
funding of political parties.”194  
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Disclosure rules, although necessary, are not sufficient for 
eliminating unconventional corruption.195  The influence of campaign 
contributions may be independent of any amounts spent because the 
influence could also depend on the credible threat of contributions or 
expenditures to benefit the elected official’s opponent.196  For example, 
imagine that a wealthy business owner announced that he or she 
intended to spend vast sums of money to defeat any elected official 
who supported workers’ rights legislation.  If an elected official learned 
of the business owner’s threat and decided to change his or her position 
on workers’ rights, there would be little doubt that such change was the 
result of the business owner’s threat.  Disclosure rules, however, would 
not be able to quantify the business owner’s influence or the elected 
official’s act of unconventional corruption.197  Notably, it is in this 
regard that the United States has experienced a great deal of 
unconventional corruption despite its well-established disclosure 
requirements for campaign contributions.198   
 
In order to effectively combat unconventional corruption, laws 
must limit campaign contributions and independent campaign 
expenditures in their amounts.199  When contributions and expenditures 
are limited, elected officials have less incentive to engage in 
unconventional corruption, and the effects of unconventional 
corruption are likely to be less problematic because elected officials 
will need to appeal to a greater number of individuals in order to 
receive significant financing.  Unconventional corruption is most 
detrimental to a democracy when there only a few parties making large 
contributions or expenditures, as opposed to when there are many 
                                                     
195 Yingling, supra note 2, at 275; see also B. Guy Peters, Performance-
Based Accountability, in PERFORMANCE ACCOUNTABILITY AND 
COMBATING CORRUPTION 15 (2007) (“Transparency and openness are 
necessary, but perhaps not sufficient, to produce accountability in the 
public sector.”). 
196 LESSIG, supra note 21, at 258 (citing Marcos Chamon and Ethan 
Kaplan, The Iceberg Theory of Campaign Contributions 2-5 (Apr. 
2007), http://people.su.se/~ekapl/jmp_final.pdf). 
197 Yingling, supra note 2, at 275-76. 
198 Id. at 282-302. 
199 Id. at 276; see also Kuhner, supra note 194, at 88 (recommending a 
limit on campaign contributions and expenditures based on a human 
rights approach to money in politics). 
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parties making small contributions or expenditures.200  To advocate for 
limits on contributions and expenditures, however, is not to advocate 
that they be prohibited.  In fact, it is critical that they not be prohibited, 
otherwise candidates for public office who are not independently 
wealthy might lack the ability to communicate their messages to their 
constituencies.201   
 
In a similar regard, while limits on independent third-party 
campaign expenditures are necessary to combat unconventional 
corruption, limits on candidate expenditures (which currently exist in 
Egypt) can be detrimental to the system.  Poorly calculated limits on 
candidate expenditures can have negative consequences.202  
Specifically, if the limits are too low, a candidate may be rendered 
unable to effectively communicate with a constituency.203  In general, 
campaign finance laws should allow candidates to effectively 
communicate with their constituencies, and at the same time, ensure 
fairness and accountability to the people.204 
 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
 
Egypt’s revolution of January 25, 2011 was fueled by a desire 
to limit conventional corruption—illegal activity that has long existed 
in Egypt.  The country’s transition, although chaotic and tragic in some 
respects, has not been void of positive developments.  The 2012 
Constitution, while imperfect, provides for greater restraints on power, 
especially in the executive branch.  As a result, with time and further 
action, Egypt has an opportunity to realize a goal of the revolution and 
experience a drop in conventional corruption.  However, when 
conventional corruption is on the decline, unconventional corruption is 
likely on the rise.  Fortunately, unconventional corruption is not an 
inevitable side effect of progress—it can be contained.  With a certain 
bit of insight and courage, the people of Egypt can reform their 
campaign finance system and bring forth a true democracy—one where 
elected officials make decisions not for the benefit of potential political 
funders, but rather, for the benefit of the people. 
                                                     
200 Yingling, supra note 2, at 276 (citing Issacharoff, supra note 19, at 
133). 
201 Yingling, supra note 2, at 276. 
202 Id. at 318-19. 
203 Id. 
204 Id. at 275-77; Youssef, supra note 185.  
